Quantum secret sharing (QSS) is a cryptographic protocol in which a quantum secret is distributed among a number of parties where some subsets of the parties are able to recover the secret while some subsets are unable to recover the secret. In the standard ((k, n)) quantum threshold secret sharing scheme, any subset of k or more parties out of the total n parties can recover the secret while other subsets have no information about the secret. But recovery of the secret incurs a communication cost of at least k qudits for every qudit in the secret. Recently, a class of communication efficient QSS schemes were proposed which can improve this communication cost to d d−k+1 by contacting d ≥ k parties where d is fixed prior to the distribution of shares. In this paper, we propose a more general class of ((k, n)) quantum secret sharing schemes with low communication complexity. Our schemes are universal in the sense that the combiner can contact any number of parties to recover the secret with communication efficiency i.e. any d in the range k ≤ d ≤ n can be chosen by the combiner. This is the first such class of universal communication efficient quantum threshold schemes.
I. INTRODUCTION
Motivation. A quantum secret sharing protocol enables the secure distribution of a secret among mutually collaborating parties so that only certain collections of parties can recover the secret. Since the proposal of quantum secret sharing for classical secrets by Hillery et al. [10] and its extension to share quantum secrets by Cleve et al. [5] there has been extensive research in this field [6] , [8] , [13] , [14] , [16] , [18] , [20] , [21] . Quantum secret sharing schemes provide greater security than classical secret sharing schemes [10] . Quantum secret sharing has been experimentally demonstrated by many groups [1] , [4] , [7] , [9] , [15] , [19] , [22] , [24] . In this paper we are interested in optimizing the resources needed for quantum secret sharing. Specifically, we propose communication efficient quantum secret sharing (CE-QSS) schemes.
The most popular quantum secret sharing scheme is the quantum threshold secret sharing scheme (QTS). In this scheme a minimum of k players are required to recover the secret. It is often denoted as a ((k, n)) scheme indicating that z ≥ k players out of the n players can recover the secret. Such a scheme can share one secret qudit. The state given to each player is called the share of the player. After the secret has been shared the players who plan to recover the secret combine their shares together and reconstruct the secret. Alternatively, the parties involved in the recovery could communicate all or part of their share to a third party designated as the combiner. The amount of quantum communication is called the communication complexity for recovery. The standard method due to [5] requires the mn qudits to be shared for share distribution and at least mk qudits for recovery.
The analogous problem of reducing communication complexity has been studied classically [2] , [3] , [11] , [12] , [17] , [23] but not as much in the quantum setting. Only recently, Ref. [20] showed that the quantum communication cost during recovery can be reduced by using a subset of players whose cardinality is more than the threshold required to recover the secret. The gains can be significant and for a ((k, 2k − 1)) threshold scheme, they showed that the gains in communication complexity of recovery per secret qudit can be as large as O(k). One limitation of those schemes was that these gains were only for a subset of players whose size d was fixed. Contribution. In this paper, we address the problem of designing quantum threshold schemes that are universal in that any subset of size d ≥ k would provide gains in communication cost during recovery. Our schemes generalize the classical schemes of [2] , [3] to the quantum setting. We denote them as ((k, n, * )) schemes. In an earlier work [20] , a construction for ((k, n, d)) communication efficient QSS has been proposed. However, that construction only works for a fixed value of d in the range of k < d ≤ n. The value of d is decided prior to encoding of the secret and cannot be changed. When d parties are contacted, the proposed construction achieves the same communication complexity as that of fixed d. So there is no loss in communication complexity with the increased flexibility to change d. This is the first such class of communication efficient quantum threshold secret sharing schemes where the number of parties contacted can be varied from k to n. Notation. We define the two qudit operator L α as L α |i c |j t = |i c |j + αi t ,
where i, j ∈ F q and α ∈ F q is a constant. The subscript c and t indicate that they are control and target qudits respectively. This operator generalizes the CNOT gate. We take the standard basis of C q to be {|x | x ∈ F q }. We denote |x 1 x 2 · · · x ℓ by |x where x is the vector (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x ℓ ). The standard basis for C q ℓ is taken to be {|x | x ∈ F ℓ q }. For any invertible matrix K ∈ F ℓ×ℓ q , we define the unitary operation U K
where y = (y 1 , . . . , y n ) and y i = j K ij x j . As the mapping L K : x → Kx is a bijection from F ℓ q to F ℓ q for any invertible matrix K, clearly U K is a unitary operation.
Let A = [a ij ] be an m × n matrix from F m×n q . Then |A indicates the state |a 11 a 21 . . . a m1 |a 12 a 22 . . . a m2 . . . |a 1n a 2n . . . a mn . Let K be an invertible m × m matrix. Then applying K to the state |A is defined as transforming state |A to |KA by U ⊗n K . Consider the matrices B 1 , B 2 , . . . , B f where each of these f matrices has the same n number of columns. Then, we use the notation |A(
. . B t f t .
We use the notation [n] := {1, 2, . . . , n} and [i, j] := {i, i+ 1, . . . , j}. Let V be a m×n matrix and A ⊆ [m], B ⊆ [n]. We denote by V A , the submatrix of V formed by taking the rows indexed by entries in A. Similarly, we can form a submatrix of V by taking the columns of V . This is indicated as V B . We can also form a submatrix V B A which takes some rows and columns from V . Illustration. In this section, we give an example to illustrate the gains in communication complexity for a suitably designed quantum threshold scheme. Later sections in this paper provide a construction for such universal communication efficient quantum secret sharing schemes. A running example for the proposed construction is included in the paper.
Consider a secret of three qudits with each qudit of dimension 7. This secret will be encoded into 15 qudits, giving three qudits to each of the five parties. Every qudit is of dimension 7. Define matrices V and M as follows. 
Then the encoding for a universal QTS scheme is given by the following mapping where r = (r 1 , r 2 , . . . , r 6 ) and c ij is the (i, j)th entry of C = V M .
When combiner requests d = 5 parties, they send the first qudit their shares, namely c i,1 . When d = 4, the combiner accesses the first two qudits of each share of the four parties contacted. When d = 3, the combiner accesses all three qudits of the share of the three parties contacted.
Consider the case when d = 5 i.e. the first qudits from all five parties are accessed. Applying the operation U V −1 on these five qudits, we obtain Consider the case when d = 4. Assume that the first four parties are accessed. The first two qudits from the four parties are accessed. Applying the operation U K1 on the set of four second qudits, where K 1 is the inverse of V [2, 5] [4] we obtain r∈F 6 7 |c 11 c 21 c 31 c 41 c 51 |r 1 r 2 r 3 r 4 |c 52 |c 13 c 23 c 33 c 43 c 53 . (5) Then, on applying the operators L 6 |r 2 |c 11 , L 5 |r 2 |c 21 , L 3 |r 2 |c 31 and L 3 |r 2 |c 41 , see Eq. (5), we obtain r∈F 6 7 |s 1 + s 2 + s 3 + r 1 |s 1 + 2s 2 + 4s 3 + r 1 |s 1 + 3s 2 + 2s 3 + 6r 1 |s 1 + 4s 2 + 2s 3 + r 1 |c 51 |r 1 r 2 r 3 r 4 |c 52 |c 13 c 23 c 33 c 43 c 53 .
Applying the operation U K4 on the set of four second qudits, where K 4 is the inverse of V [4] [4] , we obtain where r ′ = (r 1 , r ′ 2 , r 3 , r ′ 4 , r 5 , r 6 ). In contrast, for the standard ((3, 5)) QTS due to Cleve et al. 3 qudits need to be communicated for recovery of 1 qudit of secret. In the ((3, 5, 5)) fixed d communication efficient QSS scheme from [20] , 5 qudits need to be communicated for recovery of 3 qudits i.e 5/3 qudits per 1 qudit of secret. But this scheme does not provide the flexibility of contacting four parties communication efficiently. The scheme provided above can solve that problem. It provides communication efficiency at d = 5 and as well as d = 4. However, at d = 4, this scheme gives communication cost of 8 qudits to recover secret of 3 qudits i.e. 8/3 qudits per one qudit of secret whereas the ((3, 5, 4)) fixed d CE-QSS gives 2 qudits per one qudit of secret. Our proposed construction below can provide the same communication efficiency as the fixed d CE-QSS schemes at both d = 4 and d = 5.
II. BACKGROUND
A quantum secret sharing (QSS) scheme is a protocol to encode the secret in arbitrary quantum state and share it among n parties such that certain subsets of parties, called authorized sets, can recover the secret (recoverability) and certain subsets of parties, called unauthorized sets, do not have any information on the secret (secrecy). A QSS scheme is called perfect quantum secret sharing scheme if any subset of the n parties is either an authorized set or an unauthorized set. We focus on the ((k, n)) quantum threshold schemes (QTS), where there are n players and any z ≥ k players can recover the secret while fewer than k players have no information about the secret.
The realization of a quantum secret sharing is specified by giving an encoding for the basis states of the secret. Any encoding has to satisfy the properties of recoverablity and secrecy to realize a valid QSS. The recoverability constraint implies that any authorized set must be able to recover the secret and the secrecy constraint implies that sets that are unauthorized cannot recover the secret. In this paper, in Section III-A, we describe the encoding for the proposed construction of ((k, n, * )) universal quantum threshold secret sharing scheme. In Section III-B, the proof for secret recovery is given. In Section III-C, we show that our construction satisfies the secrecy constraint.
III. UNIVERSALLY EFFICIENT QTS

A. Encoding
Communication efficient quantum secret sharing schemes for particular values of k and n = 2k − 1 can be designed to work for all possible values of d in the range k through n where k ≤ d ≤ n. We introduce the following terms before discussing the scheme. For 1 ≤ i ≤ k,
Here m is the total number of secret qudits shared. The total number of qudits with each party is also given by m. This is consistent with the fact that in a perfect secret sharing scheme the size of the share must be at least as large as the secret [8] , [13] . Now a i gives the number of qudits communicated from each accessible share when d i shares are accessed to recover the secret. This means that a i d i qudits are communicated to the combiner when d i players are contacted.
Entries in r are rearranged into k matrices i.e. R 1 of size
The matrix C, called code matrix, is defined as follows.
The encoding for a universal QTS is given as follows:
where c ij is the entry in C from ith row and jth column. For example, take k = 3. This gives n = 2k − 1 = 5, q = 7
Let q = 7. Then C, the coding matrix for k = 3 is given as 
Each entry in matrix C, c ij is a function of s and r. However, note that the D i are functions of r alone.
The encoding for the ((3, 5, * )) schemes is given by Eq. (8). For example, the corresponding c ij of the third share are given below.
c 33 = 3r 1 + 2r 3 + 6r 5 + 4r 6 , c 34 = 2r 2 + 6r 7 + 4r 8 , c 35 = 2r 4 + 6r 9 + 4r 10 , c 36 = 2r 6 + 6r 11 + 4r 12 .
Our encoding matrix is somewhat similar to the matrix used in [2] , [3] . However, there are some minor structural differences. Since we encoding quantum states in superposition, there is no need for generating random bits. Furthermore, due to the No-Cloning theorem, the total number of parties cannot exceed 2k − 1.
B. Reconstruction of the secret
The combiner can reconstruct the secret depending upon the choice of d. Once d = d i is chosen, the combiner contacts a set of any d i parties to reconstruct the secret. Each of the contacted party sends a i = m di−k+1 qudits to the combiner. In total, the combiner has dim di−k+1 = a i d i qudits. With respect to the ((3, 5, * )) example in the previous section, suppose that the third party is contacted for reconstruction. If the party belongs to recovery set of size d 1 = 5, then a 1 = 2 qudits are communicated to the combiner. Similarly, if d 2 = 4, then a 2 = 3 and if d 3 = 3, then all the a 3 = 6 qudits are sent.
The secret reconstruction happens in two stages. First, the basis states of the secret are reconstructed through suitable unitary operations. The classical secret sharing schemes stop the reconstruction at this point. But, the qudits containing the basis states of the secret can be entangled with the remaining qudits. So, in the second stage, the secret is extracted into a set of qudits that are disentangled with the remaining qudits.
Lemma 1 (Secret recovery). For a ((k, 2k − 1, * )) scheme with the encoding given in Eq. (8), we can recover the secret from any d = 2k − i shares where 1 ≤ i ≤ k by accessing only the first a i = m d−k+1 qudits from each share where m is as in Eq. (6) .
Proof. Each of the d participants sends their first a i qudits to the combiner for reconstructing the secret. Let D = {j 1 , j 2 , . . . , j d } ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , 2k − 1} be the set of d shares chosen and E = {j d+1 , j d+2 , . . . , j 2k−1 } be the complement of D. Then, Eq. (8) can be rearranged as
where we have highlighted (in blue) the basis states of the qudits communicated to the combiner. For the sake of exposition we will first cover the case of i = 1 i.e. d i = 2k −1 where all the parties are contacted for their first a 1 qudits by the combiner.
Since V is an n × n Vandermonde matrix and therefore invertible, we can apply V −1 to the state |V (S, R 1 ) and rearrange the qudits to obtain
We can clearly see that the secret is unentangled with the rest of the qudits. Therefore, we can recover arbitrary superpositions also.
Under this case, the state of the system is as follows. (This is the same as Eq. (9), only the qudits in possession of the combiner have been rearranged and highlighted.)
Note that the matrix D i−1 contains elements from the (i−1)th row of R i−1 . Rearranging the qudits, we get
with one in the jth position and zeros elsewhere. W ℓ is a (2k − ℓ) × (2k − ℓ) full-rank matrix and invertible. We have split the state |D i−1 as
, we are able to extract D i−2 and R i−1 as shown below:
Now we repeat the process with D i−2 and R i−2 to extract D i−3 and R i−2 . Rearranging the qudits, we obtain,
Repeating this process for all D i−3 , R i−2 through D 1 , R 2 and S, R 1 , and applying the inverses of W i−3 , W i−4 , . . . W 1 in successive steps to the suitable sets of qudits and rearranging, we obtain,
Consider the matrix
Now, this can be rearranged to get |S (R1,R2,...Ri−1,
Since D i−2 is formed from the (i − 2)th rows of R 1 , R 2 , . . . , R i−2 , the qudits can be rearranged to obtain,
Now, this can be rearranged to get
At this point the secret is completely disentangled with the rest of the qudits and the recovery is complete.
C. Secrecy
In the scheme given by Eq. (8), the combiner can recover the secret by accessing k parties (from case (ii) when i = k in the proof of Lemma 1). So, by No-cloning theorem, the remaining k − 1 parties in the scheme should have no information about the secret. Thus, this scheme satisfies the secrecy property. Alternatively, we can invoke [13, Theorem 5] to show that the secrecy requirement is met since all unauthorized sets are complements of authorized sets in a threshold scheme. With these results in place we have our central contribution.
Theorem 1 (Existence of universal QTS). There exists a QTS with the parameters ((k, 2k − 1, * )) such that for all values of 1 ≤ i ≤ k when any d i = 2k − i parties are contacted by the combiner, the secret can be recovered from m di−k+1 qudits received from each of the d i shares, where the secret contains m qudits as in Eq. (6).
In the standard ((k, n)) QTS, the secret can be recovered when the combiner communicates with k parties. Here, if the secret is of size m qudits, then the number of qudits communicated to the combiner is km qudits. The communication cost per secret qudit is k qudits.
In the ((k, n, d)) communication efficient QSS of [20] , the secret can be recovered when the combiner contacts k parties and receiving km ′ qudits where m ′ = d−k+1. This leads to a cost of k qudits per secret qudit. However, when the combiner contacts d parties, where k < d ≤ n is a fixed value, the secret can be recovered with a communication cost of dm ′ d−k+1 qudits. The cost per qudit is d d−k+1 which is strictly less than k. In the ((k, n, * )) universal QTS, the secret can be recovered by the combiner by accessing any d i parties, where the number of parties accessed given by k ≤ d i ≤ n is chosen by the combiner. For the chosen value of d i , the secret can be recovered by downloading dim di−k+1 qudits. The per qudit communication cost is di di−k+1 which is same as that of [20] . However, we are able to achieve this for all d i using the same scheme and not fixing d i apriori. ((3, 5,  * ) ) COMMUNICATION EFFICIENT QTS
APPENDIX EXAMPLE FOR
A. Parameters
Take k = 3. From Eq. (6), the parameters for the construction can be calculated as given below.
A secret of six qudits will be encoded into thirty qudits, giving six qudits for each party. Every qudit is of dimension 7.
B. Encoding
Encoding for this scheme can be given by the mapping 
Given these matrices V and M , for this ((3, 5, * )) scheme, the encoded state in Eq. (12) can be rewritten rearranging the qudits as follows. (With respect to Eq. (12), we have grouped the ith qudits of each party in the ith row below.) |V (s 1 , s 2 , s 3 , r 1 , r 2 ) |V (s 4 , s 5 , s 6 , r 3 , r 4 ) |V [2, 5] (r 1 , r 3 , r 5 , r 6 ) |V (0, 0, r 2 , r 7 , r 8 ) |V (0, 0, r 4 , r 9 , r 10 ) |V (0, 0, r 6 , r 11 , r 12 ) .
(15)
For completeness, we give below the the encoded state in Eq. (12) . 
C. Secret Recovery
For the encoding scheme given in Eq. (12), we can recover the secret from a subset of size d ∈ {3, 4, 5}. When d = 3, each of the three accessed parties need to send all its six qudits. When d = 4, each of the four accessed parties need to send only its first three qudits. When d = 5, each of the five accessed parties need to send only its first two qudits. We now show how to recover the secret for various sizes of the authorized set.
Case 1 : d = 5
In this case, each of the five accessed parties sends only its first two qudits. Then the encoded state in Eq. (15) can be rewritten as follows. (The basis states corresponding to the qudits accessed by the combiner are indicated in blue here.) |V (s 1 , s 2 , s 3 , r 1 , r 2 ) |V (s 4 , s 5 , s 6 , r 3 , r 4 ) |V [2, 5] (r 1 , r 3 , r 5 , r 6 ) |V (0, 0, r 2 , r 7 , r 8 ) |V (0, 0, r 4 , r 9 , r 10 ) |V (0, 0, r 6 , r 11 , r 12 ) Now, apply V −1 to the first qudits of the five parties and then apply V −1 to the second qudits of the five parties to obtain r∈F 12 7 |s 1 , s 2 , s 3 , r 1 , r 2 |s 4 , s 5 , s 6 , r 3 , r 4 |V [2, 5] (r 1 , r 3 , r 5 , r 6 ) |V (0, 0, r 2 , r 7 , r 8 ) |V (0, 0, r 4 , r 9 , r 10 ) |V (0, 0, r 6 , r 11 , r 12 ) .
On rearranging the qudits, we obtain the secret containing six qudits. |s 1 s 2 s 3 s 4 s 5 s 6 r∈F 12 7 |r 1 , r 2 |r 3 , r 4 |V [2, 5] (r 1 , r 3 , r 5 , r 6 ) |V (0, 0, r 2 , r 7 , r 8 ) |V (0, 0, r 4 , r 9 , r 10 ) |V (0, 0, r 6 , r 11 , r 12 )
Here, we have recovered any given basis state in the secret without any information leaking to the other qudits. Hence, the secret, which is an arbitrary superposition of the basis states, can also be recovered by the above operation.
Case 2 : d = 4
Assume that the first four parties have been accessed by the combiner. Secret recovery for any other set of four parties will also happen in a similar way. In this case, each of the four accessed parties sends only its first three qudits. Then the encoded state can be rewritten as follows. |V [4] (s 1 , s 2 , s 3 , r 1 , r 2 ) |V {5} (s 1 , s 2 , s 3 , r 1 , r 2 ) |V [4] (s 4 , s 5 , s 6 , r 3 , r 4 ) |V {5} (s 4 , s 5 , s 6 , r 3 , r 4 ) |V [2, 5] [4] (r 1 , r 3 , r 5 , r 6 ) |V [2, 5] {5} (r 1 , r 3 , r 5 , r 6 ) |V (0, 0, r 2 , r 7 , r 8 ) |V (0, 0, r 4 , r 9 , r 10 ) |V (0, 0, r 6 , r 11 , r 12 )
The secret recovery happens in two parts. In the first part, we extract the basis state |s 1 s 2 s 3 s 4 s 5 s 6 . In the second part, we disentangle the qudits containing the basis state from the remaining qudits. {5} (r 1 , r 3 , r 5 , r 6 ) |V (0, 0, r 2 , r 7 , r 8 ) |V (0, 0, r 4 , r 9 , r 10 ) |V (0, 0, r 6 , r 11 , r 12 ) .
Here, |V [4] (s 1 , s 2 , s 3 , r 1 , r 2 ) |r 1 = |W 1 (s 1 , s 2 , s 3 , r 1 , r 2 ) and |V [4] (s 4 , s 5 , s 6 , r 3 , r 4 ) |r 3 = |W 1 (s 4 , s 5 , s 6 , r 3 , r 4 ) where
2) To recover |s 1 s 2 s 3 s 4 s 5 s 6 , apply W −1 1 to the qudits |V [4] (s 1 , s 2 , s 3 , r 1 , r 2 ) |r 1 and then apply W −1 1 to the qudits |V [4] (s 4 , s 5 , s 6 , r 3 , r 4 ) |r 3 to obtain r∈F 12 7 |s 1 , s 2 , s 3 |r 1 |V {5} (s 1 , s 2 , s 3 , r 1 , r 2 ) |s 4 , s 5 , s 6 |r 3 |V {5} (s 4 , s 5 , s 6 , r 3 , r 4 ) |r 2 |r 4 |r 5 |r 6 |V [2, 5] {5} (r 1 , r 3 , r 5 , r 6 ) |V (0, r 2 , r 7 , r 8 ) |V (0, r 4 , r 9 , r 10 ) |V (0, 0, r 6 , r 11 , r 12 ) .
At this stage part of the |s 1 , s 2 , s 3 |s 4 , s 5 , s 6 has been successfully extracted into a separate register. But |s 1 , s 2 , s 3 is still entangled with |V {5} (s 1 , s 2 , s 3 , r 1 , r 2 ) |r 1 |r 2 and |s 4 , s 5 , s 6 is entangled with |V {5} (s 4 , s 5 , s 6 , r 3 , r 4 ) |r 3 |r 4 . Further, |r 1 and |r 3 are entangled with |r 5 |V [2, 5] {5} (r 1 , r 3 , r 5 , r 6 ) .
3) Consider the square matrix
Now, apply G 1 to |r 1 |r 3 |r 5 |r 6 to obtain, r∈F 12 7 |s 1 , s 2 , s 3 |r 1 |V {5} (s 1 , s 2 , s 3 , r 1 , r 2 ) |s 4 , s 5 , s 6 |r 3 |V {5} (s 4 , s 5 , s 6 , r 3 , r 4 ) |r 2 |r 4 |V [2, 5] {5} (r 1 , r 3 , r 5 , r 6 ) |r 6 |V [2, 5] {5} (r 1 , r 3 , r 5 , r 6 ) |V (0, 0, r 2 , r 7 , r 8 ) |V (0, 0, r 4 , r 9 , r 10 ) |V (0, 0, r 6 , r 11 , r 12 )
Rearranging the qudits, we obtain |V (0, 0, r 2 , r 7 , r 8 ) |V (0, 0, r 4 , r 9 , r 10 ) |V (0, 0, r 6 , r 11 , r 12 )
r5∈F7 |V [2, 5] {5} (r 1 , r 3 , r 5 , r 6 ) |V [2, 5] {5} (r 1 , r 3 , r 5 , r 6 )
For any given values of r 1 , r 3 and r 6 , the superposition of |V [2, 5] {5} (r 1 , r 3 , r 5 , r 6 ) |V [2, 5] {5} (r 1 , r 3 , r 5 , r 6 ) over all values of r 5 ∈ F 7 will give the uniform superposition |0 |0 + |1 |1 + . . . + |6 |6 , which is independent of r 1 , r 3 and r 6 . Hence, (16) |V (0, 0, r 2 , r 7 , r 8 ) |V (0, 0, r 4 , r 9 , r 10 ) |V (0, 0, r 6 , r 11 , r 12 ) f5∈F7 |f 5 |f 5 4) Consider the square matrix
Now, apply G 2 to |s 1 , s 2 , s 3 |r 1 |r 2 and then apply G 2 to |s 4 , s 5 , s 6 |r 3 |r 4 to obtain, |V (0, 0, r 2 , r 7 , r 8 ) |V (0, 0, r 4 , r 9 , r 10 ) |V (0, 0, r 6 , r 11 , r 12 ) f5∈F7 |f 5 |f 5
Rearranging the qudits, we obtain |s 1 s 2 s 3 s 4 s 5 s 6 (r2,r4, r6,r7...r12) ∈F 9 7 |r 2 |r 4 |r 6 |V (0, 0, r 2 , r 7 , r 8 ) |V (0, 0, r 4 , r 9 , r 10 ) |V (0, 0, r 6 , r 11 , r 12 ) |r 2 |r 4 |r 6 |V (0, 0, r 2 , r 7 , r 8 ) |V (0, 0, r 4 , r 9 , r 10 ) |V (0, 0, r 6 , r 11 , r 12 )
Here, we have completely disentangled the basis states of the secret from the remaining qudits. Hence, any arbitrary linear superposition of the basis states can be recovered by the above operations.
Case 3 : d = 3
Assume that the first three parties have been accessed by the combiner. Secret recovery for any other set of three parties will also happen in a similar way. In this case, each of the three accessed parties sends all its six qudits. Then the encoded state can be rewritten as follows. |V [3] (s 1 , s 2 , s 3 , r 1 , r 2 ) |V [4, 5] (s 1 , s 2 , s 3 , r 1 , r 2 ) |V [3] (s 4 , s 5 , s 6 , r 3 , r 4 ) |V [4, 5] (s 4 , s 5 , s 6 , r 3 , r 4 ) |V [2, 5] [3] (r 1 , r 3 , r 5 , r 6 ) |V [4, 5] (0, r 1 , r 3 , r 5 , r 6 ) |V [3, 5] [3] (r 2 , r 7 , r 8 ) |V [4, 5] (0, 0, r 2 , r 7 , r 8 ) |V [3, 5] [3] (r 4 , r 9 , r 10 ) |V [4, 5] (0, 0, r 4 , r 9 , r 10 ) |V [3, 5] [3] (r 6 , r 11 , r 12 ) |V [4, 5] (0, 0, r 6 , r 11 , r 12 ) .
Similar to d = 3 case, the secret recovery happens in two parts. First, we will recover the basis state and then we will remove the entanglement with other qudits. 1) To recover |r 2 |r 4 |r 6 , apply V [3, 5] [3] −1 to |V [3, 5] [3] (r 2 , r 7 , r 8 ) , then to |V [3, 5] [3] (r 4 , r 9 , r 10 ) and then to |V [3, 5] [3] (r 6 , r 11 , r 12 ) to obtain r∈F 12 7 |V [3] (s 1 , s 2 , s 3 , r 1 , r 2 ) |V [4, 5] (s 1 , s 2 , s 3 , r 1 , r 2 ) |V [3] (s 4 , s 5 , s 6 , r 3 , r 4 ) |V [4, 5] (s 4 , s 5 , s 6 , r 3 , r 4 ) |V [2, 5] [3] (r 1 , r 3 , r 5 , r 6 ) |V [4, 5] (0, r 1 , r 3 , r 5 , r 6 ) |r 2 |r 7 |r 8 |V [4, 5] (0, 0, r 2 , r 7 , r 8 ) |r 4 |r 9 |r 10 |V [4, 5] (0, 0, r 4 , r 9 , r 10 ) |r 6 |r 11 |r 12 |V [4, 5] (0, 0, r 6 , r 11 , r 12 )
Here |V [2, 5] [3] (r 1 , r 3 , r 5 , r 6 ) |r 6 = |W 2 (r 1 , r 3 , r 5 , r 6 ) where
0 0 0 1 2) To recover |r 1 and |r 3 , apply W 2 −1 to the qudits |V [2, 5] [3] (r 1 , r 3 , r 5 , r 6 ) |r 6 to obtain r∈F 12
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|V [3] (s 1 , s 2 , s 3 , r 1 , r 2 ) |V [4, 5] (s 1 , s 2 , s 3 , r 1 , r 2 ) |V [3] (s 4 , s 5 , s 6 , r 3 , r 4 ) |V [4, 5] (s 4 , s 5 , s 6 , r 3 , r 4 ) |r 1 |r 3 |r 5 |V [4, 5] (0, r 1 , r 3 , r 5 , r 6 ) |r 2 |r 7 |r 8 |V [4, 5] (0, 0, r 2 , r 7 , r 8 ) |r 4 |r 9 |r 10 |V [4, 5] (0, 0, r 4 , r 9 , r 10 ) |r 6 |r 11 |r 12 |V [4, 5] (0, 0, r 6 , r 11 , r 12 )
Here |V [3] (s 1 , s 2 , s 3 , r 1 , r 2 ) |r 1 |r 2 = |W 2 (s 1 , s 2 , s 3 , r 1 , r 2 ) and |V [3] (s 4 , s 5 , s 6 , r 3 , r 4 ) |r 3 |r 4 = |W 2 (s 4 , s 5 , s 6 , r 3 , r 4 ) where
To recover |s 1 , s 2 , s 3 and |s 4 , s 5 , s 6 , apply W −1 2 to |V [3] (s 1 , s 2 , s 3 , r 1 , r 2 ) |r 1 |r 2 and then to |V [3] (s 4 , s 5 , s 6 , r 3 , r 4 ) |r 3 |r 4 to obtain, r∈F 12 7 |s 1 |s 2 |s 3 |V [4, 5] (s 1 , s 2 , s 3 , r 1 , r 2 ) |s 4 |s 5 |s 6 |V [4, 5] (s 4 , s 5 , s 6 , r 3 , r 4 ) |r 1 |r 3 |r 5 |V [4, 5] (0, r 1 , r 3 , r 5 , r 6 ) |r 2 |r 7 |r 8 |V [4, 5] (0, 0, r 2 , r 7 , r 8 ) |r 4 |r 9 |r 10 |V [4, 5] (0, 0, r 4 , r 9 , r 10 ) |r 6 |r 11 |r 12 |V [4, 5] (0, 0, r 6 , r 11 , r 12 )
. The basis state |s 1 s 2 s 3 s 4 s 5 s 6 has been successfully recovered. But still it is entangled with other qudits. 4) |r 2 is entangled with |r 7 |r 8 |V [4, 5] (0, 0, r 2 , r 7 , r 8 ) , |r 4 is entangled with |r 9 |r 10 |V [4, 5] (0, 0, r 4 , r 9 , r 10 ) and |r 6 is entangled with |r 11 |r 12 |V [4, 5] (0, 0, r 6 , r 11 , r 12 ) . These entanglements will be removed in this step. Consider the matrix G 1 = 1 0 0 V [3, 5] [ 4, 5] Apply G 1 to |r 2 |r 7 |r 8 , then to |r 4 |r 9 |r 10 and then to |r 6 |r 11 |r 12 to obtain, r∈F 12 7 |s 1 |s 2 |s 3 |V [4, 5] (s 1 , s 2 , s 3 , r 1 , r 2 ) |s 4 |s 5 |s 6 |V [4, 5] (s 4 , s 5 , s 6 , r 3 , r 4 ) |r 1 |r 3 |r 5 |V [4, 5] (0, r 1 , r 3 , r 5 , r 6 ) |r 2 |V [3, 5] [4,5] (r 2 , r 7 , r 8 ) |V [3, 5] [4,5] (r 2 , r 7 , r 8 ) |r 4 |V [3, 5] [4,5] (r 4 , r 9 , r 10 ) |V [3, 5] [4,5] (r 4 , r 9 , r 10 ) |r 6 |V [3, 5] [4,5] (r 6 , r 11 , r 12 ) |V [3, 5] [4,5] (r 6 , r 11 , r 12 )
Using arguments similar to those under (16) , the state in (18) can be simplified as (r1,r2...r6 f7,f8...f12) ∈F 12 7 |s 1 |s 2 |s 3 |V [4, 5] (s 1 , s 2 , s 3 , r 1 , r 2 ) |s 4 |s 5 |s 6 |V [4, 5] (s 4 , s 5 , s 6 , r 3 , r 4 ) |r 1 |r 3 |r 5 |V [4, 5] (0, r 1 , r 3 , r 5 , r 6 ) |r 2 |f 7 , f 8 |f 7 , f 8 |r 4 |f 9 , f 10 |f 9 , f 10 |r 6 |f 11 , f 12 |f 11 , f 12
Rearranging the qudits, we obtain |s 1 s 2 s 3 s 4 s 5 s 6 (r1,r2...r6 f7,f8...f12) ∈F 12 7 |r 1 |r 2 |V [4, 5] (s 1 , s 2 , s 3 , r 1 , r 2 ) |r 3 |r 4 |V [4, 5] (s 4 , s 5 , s 6 , r 3 , r 4 ) |r 5 |r 6 |V [4, 5] (0, r 1 , r 3 , r 5 , r 6 ) |f 7 , f 8 |f 7 , f 8 |f 9 , f 10 |f 9 , f 10 |f 11 , f 12 |f 11 , f 12 5) |r 1 and |r 3 are entangled with |r 5 |r 6 |V [4, 5] (0, r 1 , r 3 , r 5 , r 6 ) . This entanglement will be removed here. Consider the matrix |r 1 |r 2 |V [4, 5] (s 1 , s 2 , s 3 , r 1 , r 2 ) |r 3 |r 4 |V [4, 5] (s 4 , s 5 , s 6 , r 3 , r 4 ) |V [2, 5] [4,5] (r 1 , r 3 , r 5 , r 6 ) |V [2, 5] [4,5] (r 1 , r 3 , r 5 , r 6 ) |f 7 , f 8 |f 7 , f 8 |f 9 , f 10 |f 9 , f 10 |f 11 , f 12 |f 11 , f 12 = |s 1 s 2 s 3 s 4 s 5 s 6 (r1,r2...r4 f5,f6...f12) ∈F 12 7 |r 1 |r 2 |V [4, 5] (s 1 , s 2 , s 3 , r 1 , r 2 ) |r 3 |r 4 |V [4, 5] (s 4 , s 5 , s 6 , r 3 , r 4 ) |f 5 , f 6 |f 5 , f 6 |f 7 , f 8 |f 7 , f 8 |f 9 , f 10 |f 9 , f 10 |f 11 , f 12 |f 11 , f 12 6) |s 1 , s 2 , s 3 is entangled with |V [4, 5] (s 1 , s 2 , s 3 , r 1 , r 2 ) |r 1 |r 2 and |s 4 , s 5 , s 6 is entangled with |V [4, 5] |V [4, 5] (s 1 , s 2 , s 3 , r 1 , r 2 ) |V [4, 5] (s 1 , s 2 , s 3 , r 1 , r 2 ) |V [4, 5] (s 4 , s 5 , s 6 , r 3 , r 4 ) |V [4, 5] (s 4 , s 5 , s 6 , r 3 , r 4 ) |f 5 , f 6 |f 5 , f 6 |f 7 , f 8 |f 7 , f 8 |f 9 , f 10 |f 9 , f 10 |f 11 , f 12 |f 11 , f 12 = |s 1 s 2 s 3 s 4 s 5 s 6 (f1,f2...f12) ∈F 12 7 |f 1 , f 2 |f 1 , f 2 |f 3 , f 4 |f 3 , f 4 |f 5 , f 6 |f 5 , f 6 |f 7 , f 8 |f 7 , f 8 |f 9 , f 10 |f 9 , f 10 |f 11 , f 12 |f 11 , f 12
Here, we have recovered any given basis state in the secret without any entanglement to the other qudits. Hence, the secret can be recovered by the above operations.
